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An Economic Market for the Brokering of Time
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July 28, 2014
Abstract
Grids offer best effort services to users. Service level agreements
(SLAs) offer the opportunity to provide guarantees upon services offered,
in such a way that it captures the users requirements, while also consid-
ering concerns of the service providers. This is achieved via a process of
converging requirements and service costs values from both sides towards
an agreement. This paper presents the ISQoS market oriented mechanism
for brokering guarantees upon completion time and cost for jobs submit-
ted to a batch oriented compute service. WS-Agreement (Negotiation) is
used along with the planning of schedules to determining pricing, ensuring
jobs become prioritised depending on their budget constraints. An eval-
uation is performed to demonstrate how market mechanisms can be used
to achieve this, whilst also showing the effects that scheduling algorithms
can have upon the market in terms of rescheduling. The evaluation is
completed with a comparison of the broker’s capabilities in relation to the
literature.
1 Introduction
Advances in Grid computing have in the recent years resulted in considerable
commercial interest in utilizing Grid and related infrastructures to support ap-
plications and services. However, there still remains the need to correctly market
such services and derive quality of service (QoS) provision, as a means to offer
compute cycles as a service. This compute as a service as provisioned in Grids
is often is often the batch oriented, bag of task applications [1] which still re-
main of great commercial and scientific interest. Significant developments in
the areas of economics for the Grid and defining the available QoS are needed,
before widespread adoption outside academia can become a reality of such a job
execution service.
In terms of QoS provision it is common within existing Grid infrastructures
for applications to be served in a best effort approach only, with no guarantees
placed upon the service quality. This is primarily due to the system centric na-
ture of existing production Grids. The emphasis being upon the queuing of jobs
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ready for computation, with the sole intent of maintaining high resource utilisa-
tion, rather than user satisfaction. This therefore acts as a significant problem
to providing QoS should the existing infrastructure be commoditised and of-
fered as a service. User-centric behaviour [2, 3] on the other hand is oriented
toward providing the greatest utility to the end user by providing guarantees
upon performance and are usually aided by a system of rewards and penalties
[4].
The research which is based on the Intelligent Scheduling for Quality of Ser-
vice (ISQoS) project [5] aimed at addressing the issue of the lack of QoS in
Grids by incorporating market mechanisms that classify the QoS obtained in
terms of task completion time and service price and by provisioning compute
services via scheduling jobs instead of queuing. This ensures that the quality
of service received is quantified in a way that reflects the use of the results
obtained. This gives the advantage that existing Grid infrastructure can be
moved away from the best effort service which limits their importance. This
work is strongly motivated towards providing time and cost guarantees, which
are further illustrated by the following three motivational scenarios. The first
is a commercial scenario, such as animation, where frames may be computed
overnight before the animation team arrives for the next day’s work, like with
any overnight batch jobs partial completion of the work delays or stops the
team from starting the next day’s work [6]. This scenario presents a commer-
cialisation of the Grid, where the use of best effort services, which have no
attached guarantees limits the economic importance of Grids. This is due to
users reluctance to pay, directly or indirectly (e.g., by contributing resources to
the Grid), for the service they receive, if there is no guarantees on performance
particularly when computed results are needed for a commercial process [7]. A
further problem is that current Grid markets are system centric and selling time
in CPU hours. This however, is not relevant to enterprise customers who have
deadlines to meet and have limited ideas about how many physical resources
are required to meet such deadlines [8], thus a more user centric approach must
be realised. The second scenario is in an academic environment where it is com-
mon before conferences for Grids to become overloaded [1]. This requires on
an academic Grid for jobs associated with the conference to be prioritised and
the results obtained in a timely manner before it becomes too late to submit to
the conference. The emphasis in this scenario is upon the limited availability of
resources and the requirement to prioritise work, to ensure the most valuable
jobs are completed first. In existing infrastructure jobs are queued and results
are returned as and when they are ready. If the Grid becomes overloaded jobs
that are of a high priority get delayed by jobs that could otherwise have waited.
In order to determine priority however users need to be incentivised to reduce
their priority, over others. An economic approach is a means to achieve this [4],
as value-oriented approaches are not sufficient, as all participants have to be
willing to report their priorities and values honestly [8]. The third scenario is
taken from the field of Urgent Computing. The aim of Urgent Computing is to
aid decision making in events [9] e.g. earthquakes prediction [10]. In such cases
it is not useful to waste time waiting for jobs to complete in a queue, as is the
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case in the best effort approach. This is principally because Urgent Computing
jobs are computationally demanding jobs which are started with a low level of
predictability and which need to be completed before a given deadline [9]. In
this scenario the time criticality is key. If deadlines are missed then the value
of the results gained by computation is negligible. Thus further emphasis can
be brought upon ensuring time guarantees.
The market mechanism introduced incorporates the use of service level agree-
ments (SLA) in which the the agreement process reflects the current conditions
on the Grid. This paper describes the broker and the mechanisms built that
facilitates market based assignments of Grid jobs to resources and of the SLAs
formation between Grid services, consumers and providers. This not only se-
cures the interests of the users in terms of time and cost guarantees but it also
ensures that the users are aware of and respond to the current resources usage
demands. Thus both system and user centric concerns can be catered for. It
is also believed that this work though in the context of Grid is applicable to
any distributed system such as Clouds where compute tasks are submitted as a
batch and results are required within a given deadline for a set price. The main
contributions of this work are therefore:
• the ISQoS market mechanism and architecture for job submissions via
SLA formation to guarantee time and cost constraints.
• to demonstrate in depth how an economic market for compute services
works in regards to the time and cost constraints.
• to relate market pressures to system behaviour such as rescheduling.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the
related work. Section 3 explains the vision of an economic broker in Grid com-
puting. Section 4 introduces the economic model, that drives the job selection
process. Section 5 presents the system architecture, including the SLA struc-
ture and the flow of events within the software components during agreement
formation. This is followed by the evaluation in Section 6.
2 Related Work
The approach in this paper focuses on brokering of in an economic context
within Grids. The focus of the related works therefore concentrates upon related
economic models and brokerage.
The work proposed here deals with time and cost guarantees, of which there
are several that takes such an approach. Early models such as First Price [2]
considers pricing upon clusters. A maximum price for a job is first set, by using
a first-price sealed-bid auction[11], where each bidder submits one bid without
knowing the others’ bids. The highest bidder then wins and pays the service
price indicated in their bid upon successful job completion. The service price is
then linked to slowdown and decreases depending on what the completion time
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would have been if the cluster had been dedicated to the job. This does not
however capture the user preference and only expressed the resource cost as a
degree of acceptable slowdown relating to non-exclusive access to resources only.
It is therefore very system centric and does not express the user’s preference for
completion of the work. Slowdown also has a strong requirement for a reference
system by which a notion of slowdown can be derived, which proves difficult in
a Grid as different providers will have different reference systems. It therefore
makes the comparison between providers unrealistic.
First Reward [3] and Risk Reward [3] pricing functions like First Price focus
upon the minimum runtime and upon slowdown, so holds similar drawbacks.
Key differences lie in that they use Vickrey auctions [12] for the winner de-
termination problem, as well as a decay rate for price determination instead.
Once a minimum runtime is reached the job’s price decays at a set rate, hence
it is similar to First Price, though a rate factor is used instead to diminish the
service price. The decay in the service price is determined for the ith job as
Pricei = MaxValuei (delayi× decayi). This however remains system centric as
a job is classed as on time if it meets its runtime estimate. There is therefore
no focus upon a user’s preference for completion time and as different providers
could have resources of different speeds, inter-provider estimates are unlikely to
hold much meaning. The loss that is generated by the decay in the service price
is also not required to be bound, creating a situation that allows for unlimited
penalties, thus it does not have properties such as budget balance and individual
rationality[13, 14]. Budget balance is required from actors within a market as
long term deficits must be subsidised making them infeasible. In cases where
penalties are without limit budget balance could never be guaranteed and is at
severe risk. Individual rationality is required equally as the utility caused by
participating in the Grid market has to increase, i.e. money gained or utility
otherwise there is no need to participate. Hence in cases where penalties are
without restriction it can severely damage this rationality. SLAs can also be
perceived as contracts and unlimited liability is impractical in a commercial
sense [15]. Risk Reward extends First Reward in that it uses a concept called
present value as an assessment mechanism for jobs of different durations as
longer jobs might delay future more profitable jobs. Present value for the ith
job is calculated as: pricei / (1 + (discount rate × remaining processing timei).
This can therefore be used to favour smaller jobs, without altering the service
price paid by the end user.
In the models First Profit, First Opportunity & First Opportunity Rate [16]
the job’s service price decays immediately at a set rate until a fixed penalty
bound is reached. This decay in starting at submission time hence acts in a
similar fashion to slowdown with larger jobs been penalised more than smaller
jobs.
There is a distinct tier structure of broker and provider, hence multi-site
Grid situations can be realised. Providers offer predictions of the number of
resources that are going to be available in the future, their prices and a proba-
bility distribution that this resource profile will actually occur in practice to the
broker, represented by the tuple <start time, duration, resources, price>. The
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sending to the broker so much information seems misguided however. As the
broker can take a lesser role and respond to offers for completing work, without
understanding how the provider intends to fulfil the offer, thus hiding how the
underlying service works.
Admission control is performed by testing if the broker’s profit is likely to
decrease, if this is the case then the job is rejected otherwise it is accepted.
After acceptance jobs are required to be completed regardless of cost, unlike
others models that permit a cancellation fee[6]. This therefore risks the broker
expending large amounts of resources, rather than potentially cancelling a job.
Similarly to First Reward & Risk Reward, LibraSLA[17] has the concept of
a penalty rate, though the deadline remains distinct from the runtime. This en-
sures it does not require a reference machine to determine slowdown. LibraSLA
has two types of deadline hard and soft. In hard deadlines the job is stopped
once the deadline is reached, while in the soft deadline case the penalty slope
is used to define compensation for delays in the completion of the work. The
highest acceptable delay and hence penalty is unlimited, so it risks system via-
bility in regards to budget balance and individual rationality [13, 14]. A budget
is established that indicates the maximum the user is willing to pay and is re-
quired to do so should the job complete on time. The service price is calculated
in the same way as FirstPrice and FirstReward as budget and max price are
equivalent. The reasoning however for the budget always been consumed fully is
however not rational as it should the demand that determines price and the user
is likely to overestimate the price of any given job. As the budget does not differ
from the service price before a soft deadline/due date, LibraSLA can be consid-
ered to lacks the economic competition that is normally associated with market
based approaches. This is because payment is not linked to resource availability
and informed competition between users. The budget/willingness to pay can
conceivably be adjusted by the end user dependent upon market conditions,
though it lacks clear guidance on determining such market conditions.
Aggregate Utility [6] like LibraSLA considers a deadline and explicitly con-
siders the notion of start-delay tolerance. This is advantageous in that users
want jobs to complete by a given time which is not necessarily equal to the
system centric notion of the job’s runtime. The service price is again set as a
gradient that is determined by a set rate of decay, which does not seem user
friendly. The penalty unlike others has a maximum bound that also serves as a
cancellation penalty after the service provider has accepted a given job.
The pricing function is on a per task basis and jobs are simply treated as
an overarching service contract. An aggregate utility function is then used to
assess the benefit of all tasks completing as opposed to a proportion of them
and awards either a bonus or penalty accordingly.
The work presented also discusses brokerage, given that economics allows
the Grid to provide self-management and quality of service for end users.
Nimrod/G represents early work within this field. It is a hierarchical, de-
centralized, agent-based scheduler [18] for Grids, aimed at running parametric
applications by using economic based scheduling[19], over a Globus based infras-
tructure [9]. It is however not a general solution for discovering resources and
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submitting general applications in a Grid environment, as it uses a restrictive
parametric declarative language. It has a limited amount of primitive scheduling
algorithms available [20] that are economically oriented. Criticism has also been
levelled against Nimrod/G and GRid Architecture for Computational Economy
(GRACE) based economics in that it does not support a comprehensive and
complex market based economy [9]. Nimrod/G has however achieved some
commercial interest, in the forked variation EnFuzion scheduler [19], therefore
as an early example of economics it is important, but like all other economic
based scheduling in Grids it has not achieved significant commercial take-up
[44].
In [21] the GridBus broker [22] and Aneka [23] middleware are used to per-
form economically oriented negotiations for Bag of Task applications. This is
quite advanced in that it can generate alternative offers in cases where the origi-
nal request for work cannot be fulfilled and also uses a deadline and cost as QoS
constraints, though it only has use for a single hard deadline [21]. During the
submission stage it asks only one provider at once based upon cost constraints
and other job requirements so does not establish a market mechanism by asking
each provider to bid for work. This means if the first provider can accept the
work then it is accepted even if another provider could have potentially given a
better offer, which can be seen to be an oversight.
The Venugopal et al. [21] implementation is also not seen to be user oriented
and agreements are heavily focussed upon resources oriented requirements of
jobs. They detail the reward for fulfilling an offer and penalty for not, along
with very rigid descriptions of reservation windows specifying how many CPUs
of what speed, with a start and end time for the reservation. This lacks flexibility
and an approach that does not explicitly indicate which reservations are needed
and merely states when the user wants the job completing by, in a graduated
manner is seen as a better approach to negotiation.
Grid-Enabled Medical Simulation Services (GEMSS) [24] is a service oriented
Grid aimed at supporting medical simulations. It uses scheduling and supports
use of the Maui [25, 26] and COSY [27] schedulers for this purpose. Web Service
Level Agreement (WSLA)[28] is used for SLA formation in GEMSS for both
advance reservations of resources and for the agreement between providers and
clients.
The economic model driving GEMSS uses a start time and single deadline for
jobs, as well as a budget. In having only a single deadline value and no gradient
it lacks the graduated economic reason for a provider to complete work on time.
Treating the SLA in a similar fashion to a contract [15] the terms are harsh
if the provider is just a few seconds late. A job is risky if there is little slack
between the estimated time of completion and time allowed to complete the job.
The lack of a gradient based approach also prevents heuristic approaches [3].
The need for a earliest permitted start time is one that any model would need
to justify, which is elusive in a scheduling situation where goods (such as the
computed results) do not perish. GEMSS facilitates swappable resource pricing
and can perform pricing based upon either a fixed rate or dynamic load.
GEMSS uses a reverse English auction for establishing the service price
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between the provider and client which is used in provider selection. This price
is used along with a weighted ranking mechanism for the comparison of the
job offers QoS parameters. The QoS parameters in use are a jobs start time,
completion time and service price. Though there does not seem a strong reason
for comparing jobs using weighted ranking, other than that the economic model
is not particularly complex, i.e. not incentivising timeliness in a graduated
fashion.
Resource Aware Policy Administrator (RAPA) [29] is a Grid resource man-
ager that aims to create SLA’s for job admission and is based upon the Globus
toolkit. It is similar in its goals to work presented here i.e. deadline based with
economics but has substantial limitations in that it has an inflexible market
model. Given the proximity in nature it is discussed in detail below.
Jobs in RAPA regarding deadlines may be one of two types, either hard or
soft, soft deadlines means the user can accommodate delay, which is fixed to a
maximum of +20% of the user’s deadline. This 20% is highly restrictive and
does not reflect the users true deadline requirements. It principally derives from
ensuring the middleware does not run out of money, as the profit policy used
allows for notionally unlimited loss as shown by the following formula [29]:
profit = maximum reward−a penalty factor×(completion time−deadline)−resource cost
It is also limited in that resource usage is allocated by a proportional share
mechanism whereas it is useful to have various scheduling mechanisms available.
The budget like in Nimrod/G is specified by the user, and represents the
maximum the user is willing to pay. In ISQoS the provider’s resource pricing
mechanism determines the cost of the resources and the user is billed accordingly
up to their budget, thus allowing the price to follow demand. In RAPA and
Nimrod/G however, this is simply accepted as the amount the user pays if all
goes well, thus requiring some mechanism to ensure the users provide a sensible
informed value, such as an auction.
GridEcon [30, 31] aimed to define a model for managing complex market-
based service oriented Grids, introducing new stakeholders such as risk brokers,
SLA monitors and price modellers [9], which provided value added services such
as capacity planning and insurance contracts [30].
In the economic framework it provided features such as Bid and Asks, which
is similar to the Condor ClassAd mechanism. Bids in GridEcon representing
the resources asked for by the buyer and Asks representing the resources made
available by the providers. An important element of matching resources to jobs
is ensuring the units of trade are common such as asking for n virtual machines
for m hours [30].
GridEcon is flexible in that it provides scope for developing either spot mar-
kets, where resources are sold and used almost immediately or futures markets,
where future capacity is traded, as part of capacity planning.
It used a top down approach, defining business models around the candidate
application and the high level goods to be traded. The lower levels of the Grid
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infrastructure had the liability to meet the demands to establish the higher level
services that was traded. This approach may suffer from the semantic gap be-
tween high level application requirements and low level resource characteristics
[9].
AssessGrid Broker [32] is a risk aware broker that implements WS-Agreement,
hence there are architectural similarities with the work presented here. The fo-
cus of the AssessGrid broker was upon risk and upon assessing of providers,
whereas here the SLA formation is different and focuses on job completion time
and the economics of job submission. AssessGrid notably had an associated
level of risk attached to an SLA and the work that it described. The SLA also
included a start and finish time for the work with an associated cost for fulfilling
the SLA as well as a penalty associated with failure.
3 The Vision of an Economic Broker
The ISQoS vision is to provide a compute service that can provide Grid services
that respect the completion time and cost constraints of end users while also
respecting the current resource demands placed upon the Grid.
To achieve this in ISQoS three main actors are utilised. The broker, the
provider and the worker nodes. The brokers aim is to query the market and
finds the best provider to compute the work on behalf of end users. The provider
aims to control local resources/workers so that it can obtain the largest profit
for the provisioning of its workers and finally the workers, whose aim is to simply
complete the work that is assigned to them.
This tiered model brings about several simplifications in regards to what
each distinct element within the ecosystem is aiming to achieve. The broker is
the highest tier within the market ecosystem. It is contacted by users as the
gateway to the Grid resources. Its principle demands are to find the users the
most appropriate resource to compute the task. Its goals are therefore to ensure
jobs get completed on time and on budget. It should therefore concentrate upon
market questions and not upon exact details of the job’s description and can
sit above such implementation details. A broker should offer incentive for its
services to be used. It therefore must offer guarantees that are backed up by
compensation, thus a broker should also intend to maximise its own profit, in
so much that it ensures such guarantees are both offered and adhered to.
The provider within the market has the principle aim of planning the work
that is to be computed. In a market ecosystem many such providers could be
envisaged to exist creating competition within the market. A tender market
is chosen as the market mechanism employed, in which the broker asks the
provider for tenders on the work to be computed. A providers main goals are
therefore to win work and to plan its execution. In attempting to win work
it must determine how much it is willing to charge. This of course is likely
to depend upon the nature of the work given and upon its expected duration.
The provider is therefore concerned with how long each task will be upon each
worker and finding the compatible set of workers. Aside from computing the du-
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ration of reservations upon resources and data transfer times on an appropriate
compatible set of resources the provider holds no further interest in the job’s
description and should confine itself to planning and making itself competitive
within the market place. Lastly the worker’s only concern is how to execute
any tasks it is given, by the provider that organises its workload. It need not
therefore consider anything other within the market then the instructions it is
given by the provider responsible for it.
4 The Economic Model
The main driver within the ISQoS system is the economic model. It drives the
negotiations between the broker and provider’s and incentives the provision of
results from jobs on time and on budget. It is therefore discussed next, first
of all the input parameters, followed by how the service price is calculated as
an output parameter of the model and finally the overall effect the model is
designed to create.
4.1 Input Parameters
One of the main roles of the economic model is to determine the service price
the user will pay to a broker for computing jobs. The model will establish a
service for computing jobs on time and on budget from underlying resources.
Resource providers have a resource cost associated with their resources, from
which the service price will be based. This will achieve a two tied market, one
tier will be a service market for job execution and the second a resource market.
The user will provide a budget to a job which is an upper limit to how much
can be paid for its completion. They will also provide their time requirements
by giving a due date and deadline. The due date is the date by which the job
should complete by and the deadline is the date by which the work would no
longer be useful. In doing this a notion of priority can be achieved, for the job
in terms of cost and completion time. The notion of a due date and deadline
in Grid scheduling is fairly unique, many pricing models use gradients but do
not derive this from two unique reference points i.e. a due date and deadline.
The benefit of gradient based approaches is that it provides the opportunity for
heuristic methods, unlike hard deadlines, which give systems little guidance on
how to proceed if no feasible schedule exists for meeting the user’s constraints
[3].
Given due date, deadline and budget information coupled with job require-
ments it will be possible for a set of schedules to be generated, either by a
single provider or by multiple providers that will generate a cost trade off curve
that shows the cost to perform a given task in a given time frame. The job
requirements details the amount of data to be transferred and an estimate by
the end user of how long each task of a job will take to compute on a reference
processor. A simple calculation of multiplying the time by the clock cycle of
the reference processor is used. This assumes that each clock cycle will perform
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a similar amount of work. This is known to be simplistic but it is required
for the scheduling process and application profiling is out of the scope of this
paper. It should also be noted that existing scheduling based Grid systems such
as OpenCCS [48, 49, 50] require an estimate of the amount of work to be per-
formed in advance. Given this information a provider can calculate the earliest
completion time at this time which indicates the minimum time by which a job
may complete (see: figure 1).
Figure 1: The Resource Cost in Relation to the Pricing Model
A major aim of this model is to provide guaranteed timing for a given price.
This therefore means the service price is required to drop if due date is passed
i.e. completion time exceeds the due date. This is because it creates an incentive
for the broker to select providers that have a schedule that will make the job
complete before the due date and deadline.
The broker needs an incentive to participate in the market i.e. individual
rationality [14, 13]. It will therefore need to charge an additional amount over
the resource cost for its usage. The user will therefore be charged a service price
that will be a percentage mark-up of the actual cost for resources e.g. +25%
of the actual cost of the resources. An alternative charging mechanism would
be to have a fixed mark-up from the resource cost. This however, presents an
issue in that the lengths of jobs can vary and estimates on task length are also
inaccurate [33]. A fixed fee as a percentage of the overall work would be liable
to fluctuate. The likelihood of this occurring in Grids means the broker may
have reduced incentive to participate in the Grid marketplace.
If the service price drops below the resource cost then there is an additional
requirement for an incentive to participate. This requirement arrives from the
need to achieve budget balance [14, 13] where the broker must not need any
supplementary funds in order for it to continue working. A cap upon the penalty
fee is therefore introduced in order to control the maximum extent to which the
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broker may make a loss upon any single job.
The mark-up may either be decided upon by the broker or chosen by the
user from a set of choices provided by the broker. The mark-up in affecting
the broker’s profit can therefore be seen as a mechanism to denote job priority.
Mark-up offers the opportunity for tiered pricing where the user can give a
priority that is attached to a numeric value of mark-up. This means a value
range with low mark-up, a mid range with a medium mark-up and a premium
range with high mark-up can be established, in order to prioritise work. This
is useful as mark-up affects both profitability and the acceptability of a job.
This is because it is a component part of the broker’s ability to reschedule a
job i.e. if the broker has spare budget and/or the service price is further from
the resource cost then it has a greater degree of money available to create such
resilience.
In summary the broker presents a service with added value, in that it will
guarantee times for a given job or compensate accordingly. The due date and
deadline will modify how much of the service charge is paid by the user, in
accordance with the mark-up and the budget allocated to the job.
4.2 Calculating the Service Price
Figure 2: Charging of the Guaranteed Time Service
Figure 2 represents how the price changes in the service market. The service
price is based upon the job completion time and is affected by the user’s due
date and deadline. Once the due date is reached the service price drops linearly
until the deadline is reached, at which point any potential loss gets no greater.
This is because the deadline is considered to be the point at which the job no
longer has any use to the client so the job may be stopped and the service
charge/penalty may then be settled.
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The service price is decided upon by the broker by selecting an offer that
represents a point on the resource cost curve from figure 1. Taking the offer’s
resource cost it then applies its mark-up. This provides the position of the
service price between the earliest completion time and the due date. The cap
on the penalty fee then provides the lowest possible point at which the z-curve
pricing function may drop to, which is when the deadline is reached.
The resource cost is derived from the offers from the resource market and
when the service price and resource cost meet indicates the breakeven point. If
the service price is below the resource cost then a loss is incurred by the broker.
The difference between the service price and user’s budget provide a measure
called budget slack, which is important to consider when accepting a schedule.
The difference between the service price and resource cost gives the broker’s
profit margin. It may make sense in certain cases to reduce the amount of profit
made in order to ensure the job completes hence avoiding loss. A further value
of budget resilience can also be given as the difference between the resource
cost and the budget, as the broker could notionally sacrifice its profit during
rescheduling in order to save the job. This therefore means the profit margin
can be seen as the minimum amount money available if the broker is forced to
reschedule due to resource failure or slowdown.
An accepted job’s worth to the provider may be derived as the difference
between the service cost charged and the maximum penalty. This is because
liabilities are reduced when an accepted job is completed, (especially if it has
a non-zero penalty cap). In order for the broker to minimise its losses the
difference between the actual cost of resources and the cap on the penalty fee
must be considered. This will be important when rescheduling or deciding upon
which jobs should be considered to be dropped from a schedule.
In figure 3 three important measures of how vulnerable a schedule is shown.
They may be derived from the difference between the selected schedule’s com-
pletion time and the following three points:
• due date
• breakeven point
• deadline
These temporal slack measures will hence act as metrics on job offer qual-
ity, along with the budgetary resilience and budget slack that was previously
discussed, along with more obvious measures such as completion time, service
price and broker profit.
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Figure 3: Charging of the Guaranteed Time Service - Temporal Aspects
4.3 Overall Effect of the Market
Figure 4: The Offers Market - An Overview of Temporal and Budgetary Aspects
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In figure 4 the effect of the temporal and budgetary constraints in the eco-
nomic model are demonstrated. Firstly the due date and deadline are repre-
sented on the x-axis as the two boundaries placed upon completion time. The
budget is placed on the y-axis as the upper boundary of the service price.
Given these initial values the mark-up can be used to derive other useful
aspects. The maximum resource cost possible where budget slack equals zero can
be derived i.e. the broker makes no profit. This leaves the mark-up indicating
the minimum amount of budgetary resilience without the broker immediately
incurring lost profit. There is also a point in between the due date and deadline
where the service price becomes equal to the resource cost and the broker merely
breakseven. This therefore completes a border around an offer defining the
acceptable service quality.
5 System Architecture
Figure 5: Overview of the ISQoS System
In this section the architecture of the broker is discussed, including in later
subsections the agreements structure, the scheduling algorithms in use, offer
ranking and selection and finally pricing policies. An overview of the architec-
ture is presented in figure 5. It primarily consists of three tiers: A broker, a
provider and workers. The broker selects the provider to use while the provider
commands the workers to execute Grid jobs. The components shown in figure
5 are utilised in the following fashion.
Jobs are submitted via the job submitter of the broker to the offer maker and
committer component of each provider. The broker is expected to contact vari-
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ous different resource providers in order to establish a competitive marketplace
i.e. multiple providers will compete for work in a tender market.
The information submitted to providers by the broker consists of the job’s
resource requirements, a budget that the user has assigned for the completion
of a job, the amount of mark-up the broker makes for the service, which can
be used as a notion of minimum available funds for rescheduling and finally its
temporal requirements. These are shown as a due date by which the job should
be completed by and a deadline by when it must be completed. Further details
of the agreements structure can be found in section 5.1.
The resource providers from this information perform the initial scheduling
of the tasks within a job so they can derive an estimate for completion time
and price. A job is considered to be made up of a set of tasks that are all
independent of one another. This is because the broker is primarily aimed at
parameter sweep / bag of task applications [34], which are the predominant
workload upon the Grid [1].
The providers derive their estimates by using a scheduling algorithm (section
5.2) and pricing mechanism (section 5.4) that is plugged into the provider. The
price is set by the provider’s local pricing mechanism which feeds information
into the scheduling algorithm. The scheduler has available to it the current Grid
state information and a resource selector component that is capable of selecting
the viable set of resources for computing each task within a job.
The schedules that are generated are converted into offers to complete the
work, which are then submitted back to the broker. These offers include in-
formation about the time and cost for completing the job and the time for
completing each task within a job.
The broker from the offers that have been returned from the tender market,
ranks them and filters out the poor offers i.e. sort by earliest completion time
first and filter out unprofitable offers, though various selection mechanisms may
be used, which are shown in section 5.3. The broker then takes the ”best offer”
as determined by ranking and filtering and asks the user if it acceptable to
proceed with the job at a given price and completion time.
If the offer made to the user is acceptable the broker then submits the bag
of tasks that make up the job to the winning provider. The winning provider
then schedules the work for a final time and then records the new state of the
Grid. In the case an offer is not acceptable the user is permitted to resubmit the
job with different budget and time requirements in order to acquire a different
offer, that may be more acceptable.
Accepted jobs are placed into the schedule which is part of the current
state information of the Grid. The state records the mappings between workers
and their jobs as well as the current resource and job statuses. Workers are
represented as objects which maintain a copy of the XML description of the
resource and a reference to the XML parser used to interpret the description.
The Worker’s description parser essentially maintains a set of default questions
which can be asked about the job i.e. what is the size of the memory avail-
able? or what is the CPU speed? Jobs are also represented by objects that
contain XML descriptions taken from the job’s associated agreement. The job
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description is attached to the agreement as an xsd:any type, which allows for
XML other than JSDL documents to be used. The descriptions of the tasks are
treated in a similar fashion to the resources and a basic list of default questions
are provided i.e. how much memory is needed. The resource selector for a given
task can then be asked to provide the list of acceptable workers to the scheduler,
without it needing to have a great understanding of what a resource entails.
A job’s description breakdowns down as follows: a job is a collection of tasks
in the bag, that need executing. Each task has several actions, these equate to:
stage in, execute, stage-out and clean the worker. Stage-out merely holds to the
meaning of transferring data away from the worker. Clean removes the task’s
working area upon a worker node. If the clean event is the very last action to
be performed for the job then the it is submitted for billing.
The action executor merely waits for the next action in the schedule to be
ready for execution. At which point it sends a signal to the worker nodes to
begin their work.
5.1 Agreement Structure
The structure of the agreements that are formed in the ISQoS system are dis-
cussed next. The ISQoS Grid architecture is service oriented and is based upon
WS-Agreement for Java (WSAG4J) [35]. It is designed in such a way that each
provider presents a job execution service. The use of WS-Agreement means re-
quests for work are responded to by providers in the form of offers to complete
the work. These offers then can be negotiated upon within a tender contract
market. The negotiation and precise structure of these offers is shown in figure
6.
The ISQoS agreement structure like all WS-Agreement based documents has
a name assigned to the offer as well as its agreement context. The agreement
context details information such as the participants belonging to the agreement.
The ISQoS Agreement because it is based upon WS-Negotiation also has a
negotiation id and a negotiation context.
The context in terms of the agreement formation process is useful. The
providers respond to offers by scheduling, after they have scheduled, they can
make an offer. If however the schedule indicates the work cannot meet all the
constraints they can set the negotiation context to advisory. This means further
work is needed in the negotiation for both sides to agree to execute the job. This
allows the ISQoS system to offer advice to the end user about the current state
of the market, in terms of price and current workload of the Grid. This of
course is expressed in terms of the job the user wants to execute and not a
generic statement about a providers current load characteristics.
In the service terms the jobs, budget, due date and deadline requirements are
given. There is also a list of tasks in the job that the user wishes to execute. For
the purpose of scheduling the task list also contains estimates by the end user of
the size of execution that is required and the amount of data that is required for
staging in and out. The broker also indicates to the providers what its mark-up
is, i.e. its commission. This allows the providers to avoid any schedules that
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Figure 6: ISQoS SLA Structure
are likely to be rejected and informs providers of the boundaries around the
budget and time constraints. These boundaries were previously demonstrated
in section 4.3.
The broker focuses upon standards such as JSDL [36]. The agreement doc-
ument however maintains the capacity to swap out the term language used
to describe the work being performed. Thus it need only be XML based so
that it can form part of the agreement. This is achieved by having the part
of the XML describing jobs contain an xsd:any type for attaching the term
language describing the job. This flexibility is also present in the information
provider which can use either GLUE [37] or Ganglia [38] based representations
of resources, though this will be discussed later.
The final parts of the service terms are for the provider to fill in. Providers
are required to give an estimated completion time for each task in the job,
along with an overall completion time and service price. These values act as
a summary of the job’s schedule and does not detail the exact location a job
will be executed. The summary values provided here hence can be used by
the broker after offers have been returned from the tender market and are the
basis of assessments made by the broker, that is shown in section 5.3. The
summary values are intended to act in an advisory fashion, so once the provider
is accepted by the broker it may schedule the job differently. A provides is
however expected to keep to a schedule that is in close proximity to its offer and
it should not schedule a job to complete further into the due date to deadline
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period than originally offered. This is because the broker will lose money as the
price of the execution service gets lower. An intelligent broker that consistently
has a job returned later than the offer by an unreliable provider could stop or
reduce the amount of work such a provider gets.
5.2 Scheduling Algorithms
The providers use scheduling algorithms to construct schedules, for the purpose
of making offers and committing to work. The providers are flexible in which
algorithms may be used. In order to allow for a range of experimentation and to
show this flexibility a default set of algorithms have been implemented. Algo-
rithms from related work such as Nimrod/G where chosen for this default set, as
well as common mechanisms such as round robin and earliest completion time.
A Round Robin variation that implements rescheduling is also implemented to
assist experimentation that involves rescheduling. The initial available set of
algorithms are hence listed as follows:
Nimrod/G’s Cost Optimize: [4, 39, 20] This algorithm simply assigns work
to the cheapest resource available until it is full i.e. the deadline is reached.
This therefore means there is no load levelling which has a significant draw-
back that if the due date/deadline is sufficiently far in the future then there
is no incentive to assign to any resource other than the cheapest. This
makes the more expensive resources more likely to be idle and the free
space on these resources are simply lost.
Nimrod/G’s Time Optimize: [4, 20] This acts like the earliest completion
time scheduling algorithm but considers cost, ensuring the budget is not
overrun. It achieves this by comparing the cost for completing a task
against the available budget per task within the job and only assigns to
resources that are less than or equal to the available budget for a given
task.
Nimrod/G’s Cost Time Optimize: [20, 40] Acts as an improvement to the
cost optimize algorithm. It performs grouping based upon cost. It then
selects the fastest machine within the cost group. This avoids some of the
poor load levelling behaviour of the cost optimize scheduling algorithm,
by ensuring it assigns work to all resources with the same price. This
however will not cope with costs on a continuous scale and a cost that is
very marginally different will be placed into a different grouping.
Cost Per Cycle Optimize: Assigning work to the cheapest resource per cycle
is considered best of of such algorithms. This hence acts as a variation
upon Nimrod/G’s Cost Optimization algorithm. This is considered to be
a better way of performing the allocation in that it avoids grouping and
falsely identifying the cheapest resources, though it still however lacks load
levelling features.
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Earliest Completion Time: This creates an earliest time to compute and
transfer data matrix and selects the fastest option. It is like Time Optimize
algorithm in this regard but omits budget checks. It hence is more suitable
for ISQoS as it may be used for offering advice rather than simply failing
to provide a schedule.
Round Robin: This performs basic round robin order selection of resources,
excluding all resources that are unsuitable for a given task and contin-
uing iteratively until a compatible resource is found. It is used in the
experimental section along with the rescheduling variation.
Round Robin Rescheduling: This performs basic round robin order selec-
tion and pushes new jobs in as early as possible into the schedule by the
moving of existing jobs. The aim of this was to diminish the acceptance
preference of jobs based upon how early they arrive. The details of this
algorithm are listed in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Round Robin Rescheduling
FOR EACH (Task) {
Get next worker in round robin order that meets resource
requirements, skipping the turn of workers that do not meet requirements;
IF Worker.isEmpty() {
Place Task’s Actions; BREAK; }
FOR EACH (ACTION in Task) {
FIND insertion point WHERE (
Later Actions will not go past their Due Date
AND No action already started will be moved
AND No action due to start will be moved );
Place Action in earliest position possible;
move existing actions later on;
BREAK;
}
}
5.3 Offer Ranking and Selection
The broker in order to make a profit must generate the appropriate level of QoS.
To do this it must decide which jobs are practical to compute within the allotted
time and by which provider. This brings about various selection strategies for
offers to compute jobs. There are three principle mechanisms by which selection
may be performed, these are namely:
• Random: This selection mechanism randomly picks a provider.
• Current load: This mechanism hooks into the information provider and
then asks which provider is the least loaded.
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• Sort and Filter: This is the most complex mechanism available as it gives
a wide variation of options. It first of all sorts offers using a wide variety
of possible comparators and then it makes a selection, while filtering out
some offers.
The load based and random selection mechanisms also having variations that
test for broker profitability, thus ensuring the broker cannot accept work that
is expected to cause a loss in profit. The sort and filter selector has some varia-
tions of the filtering mechanism that can equally perform a test for profitability.
The sort and filter selection mechanism is the most complex out of the avail-
able mechanisms due to the possibility of choosing various sorting and filtering
mechanisms. The options available are therefore discussed in more detail in
sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Offer Sorting Mechanisms
The sorting mechanisms available are listed below, though this list is implicitly
twice the size as the Sort and Filter selector may reverse the order:
• Budgetary Resilience: The difference between the budget and the esti-
mated cost. This hence within the ISQoS pricing model ranks all offers by
how much spare money is available to the broker for rescheduling should
something go wrong.
• Cheapest: The offers are sorted by their total price.
• Earliest: The offers are sorted by completion time earliest first.
• Profit: The offers are sorted by the broker’s profit, most profit to least.
• Profit Rate: This is the broker’s profit margin / duration of the job.
• Profit Then Earliest: This first of all sorts by profit and then by completion
time.
• Profit Then Latest: This first of all sorts by profit then by completion
time in the reverse order.
The comparators that focus on profit and have a second order sort must
be used correctly, otherwise the incorrect profit comparators could be selected.
This is especially the case given the reversing of the ordering. The Profit then
Earliest sort has the following properties:
Natural Order: Profit is least to most and Completion Time is earliest to latest.
Reverse Order: Profit is most to least and Completion Time is latest to earliest.
Caveat: Offers arriving the latest are first.
This is dealt with by the Profit then Latest sort which has the following
properties:
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Natural Order: Profit is least to most and Completion Time is latest to earliest.
Reverse Order: Profit is most to least and Completion Time is earliest to latest.
5.3.2 Offer Filtering Mechanisms
The offers once sorted need to be filtered and an option selected from the list
of available offers. The permitted options for filtering are:
• Minimum Profitability: A minimum acceptable profit is set. The topmost
offer that meets this criteria is selected.
• Minimum Profitability Rate: A minimum rate of profit is set for the bro-
ker. The topmost offer that meets this criteria is selected.
• Hybrid Offer Filter [41]: as shown in Algorithm 2, is a filtering mechanism
that aims to accept all jobs that have no constraint issues and evaluates
all others based upon a comparison to a going rate that is established
from the last n records of accepted offers. It is hence a hybrid between a
going rate filter and a topmost profitable filter. In doing this it has several
advantages, which are listed below:
Algorithm 2 ISQoS Hybrid Offer Filter
FOR EACH (Offer) {
Sort the offers based upon the ranking mechanism chosen;
IF Completion Time <= Due Date AND
Service Price <= Budget {
Accept Offer; BREAK;
} ELSE {
Take the last n accepted offers and find the average rate
at which profit accumulates and establish the going rate;
IF Current offer profit rate >=
(going rate − acceptable deviation below going rate) {
Accept Offer; BREAK;
}
}
}
– If the constraints are fully met then the job is automatically accepted.
The main advantage of this is that if the arrival rate of jobs slows
then unconstrained (fully profitable) jobs are always accepted. The
pricing model dictates that these jobs are the most profitable possible
anyway. This can be contrasted with a going rate calculation which
may not accept a job with a lower profit even if it could fit with
no problem. This is particularly advantageous if different mark-ups
are in use and other factors such as differing network transport cost
compared to the cost of computation.
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– If offers are constrained by either time or budget then a going rate
assessment is performed. If the offer still remains profitable enough
then it is accepted, hence if jobs with different mark-up’s arrive they
will be treated differently and higher mark-up based jobs may still
make a sufficient profit to be acceptable.
– It can be expected on an unused Grid that jobs will be accepted
readily, this hence removes the immediate need for a history of records
and alleviates the issues of starting with no information from which
to determine the going rate.
• Near Going Rate: This establishes from a history of the last n records
the current rate at which profit is accumulated by the broker. It then
establishes a minimum value below this that is acceptable. If the new offer
is above this threshold then it is accepted. The previous jobs are used to
establish the going rate. Both the history size and a proximity below the
going rate considered to be acceptable are configurable. The advantage
of specifying deviation from the going rate over having a minimum profit
rate is that it better follows demand and will automatically adapt if the
environment changes. An example of this would be if the amount of
resources available changed which would allow more space in the Grid,
that in turn means more jobs could be accepted causing the service price
to change when dynamic pricing is used.
• Topmost Offer: This selects the topmost offer from the sorted list of offers,
with no further selection criteria.
• Topmost Profitable Offer: This selects the topmost offer from the sorted
list that is profitable. If no offer is acceptable then no option is provided
to the end user for execution. The offers would then solely be used to
advise the end user how much they could be expected to pay to have work
completed on time.
5.4 Pricing Mechanisms
In the ISQoS Grid the providers have to set their own price. This has to be set
competitively and it has to reflect the current load the provider is experiencing
i.e. price has to follow demand.
This demand is caused by the acceptance of jobs by the provider and is
expressed in the provider’s schedule. The schedule has a set of jobs which are
made up of tasks which are in turn comprised of actions, which have to be
assessed for the demand they represent for the provider’s resources.
The actions consist of stage in, execute, stage out and clean. Stage-out only
represents the transferring of files while clean-up cleans and bills the work. The
stage in and execute actions may also be combined to form a single action,
meaning the worker nodes will automatically start execution once the stage-
in has been completed. These actions together establish the demand on the
provider and its resources.
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This demand the actions create when assessed may be for the provider as a
whole or it may be performed so the price is different for each given resource.
The provider level price setting mechanisms are therefore:
A count of actions that the provider has to perform: The amount of ac-
tions in a provider’s schedule is counted and then a price is assigned ac-
cordingly. The number of actions is proportional to the number of tasks
so it was not seen to be of any use to count tasks. Actions are placed in
a queue of actions that the provider is expected to start, so task counting
against a list of actions takes more computational effort.
The average finishing time of work on the provider’s resources: This would
be similar to the ”count of provider actions” metric but would account for
jobs of varying lengths. The completion time of the last action in the
schedule is compared to the current time. This value is then mapped
across to a price written in a configuration file on disk.
A static resource price: This is the most basic case where a static singular
price is set for the provider as a whole.
This can also be set at a similar fashion for each individual resource/machine:
A count of actions that a particular machine has to perform: A varia-
tion upon the ”count of provider actions” metric but the count is per-
formed for each resource which is then priced separately. This variation
can therefore be used when cost guides local resource selection.
The finishing time of all work on a particular machine: A variation upon
the ”count of machine actions” metric but would account for jobs of vary-
ing lengths. The completion time of the last action in the schedule is com-
pared to the current time and from this value it is then mapped across to
a given price.
A static resource price: This is the most basic case where a static singular
price is set for the provider as a whole forming a default. Individual named
resources are then allowed to take an alternative fixed price.
6 Evaluation
In order to evaluate the proposed model experimentation is presented here that
was performed upon a test bed. It concentrates upon job prioritisation and
price stability within the ISQoS Grid as a means of demonstrating the market
model presented and how it distinguishes between jobs in terms of QoS levels.
23
6.1 Experimental Details
We first of all describe the experimental method and setup of the resources used
during the experimentation and then discuss the settings used in the experimen-
tation.
We established a Grid with 2 providers/clusters of machines. Each provider
had 4 virtual machines (VMs) of which one also acted as a head node. Jobs
were submitted at intervals, from a separate broker virtual machine instance.
This prevented the broker from making one provider less competitive than the
other. In total the experiment hence had 9 virtual machines.
The virtual machines ran Ubuntu 11.10 (64bit) server, with full virtualization
and ran upon 4 physical hosts. The virtual environment was constructed using
OpenNebula 2.0 [42] and Xen 4.0.1 [43]. Each head node had 1GB of RAM
allocated and the worker nodes had 768MB and the processors each ran at
a speed of 2.4GHz. The head nodes were allowed to be allocated to by the
scheduler ensuring the resource space allowed was as large as possible. The size
of the Grid was chosen because of the limited resources available. It was also
desirable to have competition between providers so 2 providers were used.
The ISQoS Grid which was setup on the VMs uses WS-Agreement for Java
v1.0 for the Broker and Provider agreement process. Ganglia 3.2.0 [38] was used
to provide resource information to each of the head nodes, about the availability
of its resources.
There were 6 runs of each trace taken and 95% confidence intervals are hence
marked on the figures shown in the results section. The first 15 accepted jobs of
the traces have been ignored to counteract effects of starting with an unloaded
Grid.
The experiment was run with 100 jobs with 8 tasks each being sent from the
broker. The broker had to select either to accept the job and submit to one of
the two providers or reject the job. Jobs were submitted with a 30 second gap
between submissions. This is shorter than the time it takes to compute a job,
which means the Grid fills and resources become sufficiently scarce as per a time
sensitive, high utilization scenario as discussed in the motivational scenarios.
Jobs were setup to be none data intensive and the stage in/out size was only
1 Megabyte. This mitigates issues with considering the network configuration
of the virtual cluster upon the available testbed. The execution size estimate
for each task was given as a value of 3,000. This value is provided by the end
user. It derives from the user considering a reference processor and estimating
how long an application will run for on such a processor. This is known to be
simplistic, but profiling applications was seen to be out of scope of this paper.
A reference speed of 3,000 MHz is hence multiplied by an expected duration of
1 minute. This means upon the resources on the testbed that the tasks were
also expected to last approximately 1 minute.
This means that if a job was allocated to a single machine it would take 8
minutes to complete. The due date was hence set no lower than the submission
time + 8, with the knowledge that the Grid would soon be overtaxed. The
deadline was set to the due date + 4 minutes.
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Three different budgets that jobs could be given were established: 12,000
15,000 and 18,000 and a fixed markup of 20% was chosen. These values were
chosen as they intersected the likely prices that would be generated at different
stages of the experiment.
During the course of the experimentation rescheduling is introduced. In
section 6.2.1 the round robin scheduling algorithm is used. A rescheduling based
variation is then used in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.4. The algorithms implemented by
the providers may be found in section 5.2. The round robin scheduling algorithm
was chosen because the scope of the paper is brokering and economics and a
provider only had to create a schedule in a reliable fashion. A round robin
scheduling algorithm also acts in a similar fashion to a queue based system
which is in keeping with exiting Grid infrastructures.
A dynamic resource pricing mechanism was chosen which bills time for both
the use of network time and resource time equally. It derived its charge from
the count of actions that the provider currently has in its schedule, which maps
across to a set price (see section 5.4). The provider thus tracks current de-
mand when setting its price by this method. This method was chosen as the
jobs being submitted were of equal size and there was no great need for a more
complex solution. If jobs were of a different size it would be required to have
a more complex solution as the tasks might not be of comparable size meaning
counting actions would not truly reflect current resource demand. The schedul-
ing algorithm in use was not price aware so a single price could be set for all
resources upon a given provider. It is possible to count the price either across
the provider as a whole or against a single resource. Seen as the algorithms did
not account for price i.e. for load levelling purposes there was no need to set
prices differently. In section 6.2.4 the pricing mechanism is changed so it ignores
work that has been started or finished.
The broker used the hybrid offer filter selection mechanism (see: algorithm
2) and ranked jobs by broker profit, the offer ranking and selection mechanism
used is shown in figure 5.3.
6.2 Results and Analysis
6.2.1 Job Prioritisation
A distinct part of any economic model is the ability to drive prioritisation within
the market. Figure 7 shows this as a gradual effect as higher budgets become pri-
oritised over lower budgets when the due date and deadline is gradual increased.
Initially there is no preference based upon budget shown and the temporal con-
straints take precedence. When the due date is at 12 minutes the lowest budget
jobs at 12,000 start to be penalised and by 16 minutes the lowest budget jobs
are all but completely rejected. This demonstrates selection based upon bud-
get which is highly preferential and how its emergence can be restricted by the
temporal constraints. The emergence of market pressures occurs because as the
due date increases a greater amount of the work is allowed to be scheduled con-
currently on each provider. This causes the resource costs to increase to match
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Figure 7: Transition to Budget Prioritisation - With Round Robin Scheduling
the demand. In doing so the lower priority/budget jobs then are priced out of
the market.
The jobs with the highest budgets are shown to be accepted more readily
in an ever increasing fashion, whilst the middle budget range jobs increases
temporarily as the lowest budget jobs are no longer accepted. This prioritisation
of jobs based upon the budget is seen to be a valuable property of the submission
system especially as it is achieved without any need for jobs to directly compete
in an auction style for resources.
In figures 8, 9 and 10 constraint violations are counted. If the budget con-
strains a job then a budget violation counter is incremented. A temporal con-
straint violation is considered to have occurred if the time before the breakeven
point is less than zero i.e. where the job is no longer making a profit. This point,
where the broker breaks even, is 16.67% of the way between the due date and
deadline [41]. It was useful to pick this point as the deadline was unlikely to be
ever passed due to the hybrid offer filter admission policy in use as it filters out
unprofitable jobs, hence any job that would complete too close to the deadline
would be rejected.
In figure 8 it can be seen that the constraint violations are initially of the
temporal type only, this is because the highly restrictive temporal constraints
are dominating, ensuring the overall schedule size does not increase sufficiently,
which limits the service price. As the due date gets larger the budget constraints
become more dominant as larger schedules cause the service price to rise.
In figure 9 and 10 the selection pressures for jobs with specific budgets,
namely 12,000 and 15,000 are shown, demonstrating the biasing towards the
higher priority/budget jobs.
Figure 9 shows that initially jobs are either not meeting the temporal con-
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Figure 8: All Constraint Violations - With Round Robin Scheduling
Figure 9: Constraint Violations with a Budget of 12,000 only - With Round
Robin Scheduling
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straints or they are accepted. As the due date increases the budget constraints
become dominant. Though temporal constraints are still being violated, it is
also the case that the budget constraints are being violated as well, this in
essence means the budget constraints are taking precedence as violating both
constraints is equivalent to only violating one constraint.
Figure 10: Constraint Violations with a Budget of 15,000 only - With Round
Robin Scheduling
Figure 10 like figure 9 again shows that initially jobs are either not meeting
the temporal constraints or they are accepted. As the due date is increased
the budget constraints again become more dominant, but it takes much longer
for jobs to be predominantly rejected because of budget violations, which is an
indication of the desired property of prioritisation.
Further insight into the effects of increasing budget in terms of selection can
be seen in terms of the start delay associated with each billed job is shown in
figures 11 and 12. Figure 11 shows values for all due dates and figure 12 for
higher due dates of: 18, 20 and 24. It is apparent that the higher budget jobs
obtain higher start delays as compared with lower budget jobs. This seems
initially counter to what is required, however the start delay shows how long a
job has to wait for before it is executed and hence how busy the provider is at
the time of billing. Therefore more jobs in the schedule means not only that
jobs have to wait longer to be executed, but that the price is higher for a job
to be placed in the schedule, due to the higher demand. This means that if a
job has a higher budget it has greater scope of being accepted into the larger
schedules where it would have otherwise have been rejected. This can be seen
when examining figures 11 and 12 side by side. Initially it can be seen in the
earlier bills in figure 12 that the lower budget jobs (12,000) are delayed equally
as with all other jobs but are then priced out of the market by the time the
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Figure 11: Average Start Delay Across 6 Runs - With Round Robin Scheduling
- For All Due Dates
Figure 12: Average Start Delay Across 6 Runs - With Round Robin Scheduling
- For Due Dates 18, 20 and 24
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Grid reaches full load. It can also be seen that the averages are higher in figure
12 than figure 11 due to the exclusion of the lower due dates, which is discussed
next.
Due date also effects the start delay as it simply permits greater delays to
be possible as shown in figure 13. The start delay can also be seen to be tending
towards a steady state, which is obtained faster when the temporal constraints
are made more stringent. This indicates that if production systems were to
follow this model that the intent of users to obtain the fastest completion time
and setting temporal constraints accordingly is hence likely to cause stabilisation
faster in regards to delays incurred.
Figure 13: Start Delay - With Round Robin Scheduling - Shown By Due Date
6.2.2 Rescheduling
The ISQoS providers can use different scheduling algorithms as shown in section
5.2. This can introduce more complex situations where rescheduling may be
performed. The introduction of scheduling can cause profound effects upon
the market, which is shown next. In the case where rescheduling is performed
similar results can be obtained to the none rescheduling case. There are however
notable differences.
Figure 14 demonstrates that the budget constraint becomes more dominant
than the temporal constraints much later on as compared to figure 8. This is
reflected in the distinction between the amount of jobs accepted of each type,
where the lower budget jobs are no longer rejected entirely, which is considered
to be caused by greater fluctuations in the service price.
These fluctuations in service price can be seen in figure 15, which is a trace
of the service price over the 6 runs which have a due date of 20. It shows that
when rescheduling occurs the service price drops significantly at various stages
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Figure 14: All Constraint Violations - With Rescheduling
Figure 15: Effect upon Service Price of Rescheduling (Due Date = 20, Average
of all Runs)
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in the trace, which is not the case where rescheduling is not in use. The drop
in price means it becomes low enough for the lower budget jobs to be accepted.
This is the case even though the temporal constraints are relaxed meaning that
higher workloads on the server could be expected. These higher workloads would
therefore give rise to an expectation that the service prices was also high.
6.2.3 Causes of Price Instability
In order offer an explanation for what is happening and why the price is being
reduced a simplified case is presented. A single processor is examined, with the
arrival of four jobs that submitted in sequence. The temporal constraints is
simplified and due date is considered to be equal to the deadline and the time is
represented as discrete time rather than continuous. The arrival of each of the
four jobs is shown, with the top row representing the processors availability and
the rows after representing the jobs availability. The time increments on by one
step each time and is represented by the dashed area on the figures presented
next. This example is presented for the rescheduling and round robin cases to
enable the examination of the differences between the two sample cases.
Figure 16: Instability Demonstration - Round Robin
In figure 16 the round robin base case is presented. It can be seen that Job
1 arrives on the processor and takes up two blocks but has a deadline of four
ahead of its arrival time. The processor is free so it is allocated immediately. The
arrival of Job 2 one block of time later means Job 1 and Job 2’s allocable space
overlaps. Job 1 having already been allocated takes priority and Job 2 is placed
afterwards. Similarly this happens to Job 3. Job 4 arrives and its allocatable
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space is all but overlapped by Jobs 2 and 3 and as they arrived first and their
reservations are respected, hence Job 4 is rejected. This is unremarkable but is
established so the rescheduling case may be examined as well.
Figure 17: Instability Demonstration - Rescheduling
In figure 17 we see the rescheduling case being demonstrated. The arrival
of Job 1 is handled in much the same way as before given the processor is
unloaded. The next arrival one block of time later means Job 1 and Job 2’s
allocable space overlaps. This time in order to break the precedence of earlier
jobs always coming first, Job 1 takes a lower priority. The first block/in this
case a task has already been executed. The second ”block in the job”/task may
now however be postponed. Job 2 hence starts immediately in this time period.
When Job 3 arrives Job 2 is prevented from moving by the end of Job 1. Job
3 is hence placed at the end of the processors available space. Finally Job 4
arrives and it is again rejected due to a lack of space.
This simple case shows how the jobs that arrived earlier can block future
jobs from being moved. It also shows how the billing of each job can be moved
closer together. This is important as this removes work from the schedule. Once
this has been done it means the service price drops, in cases where all actions
in the schedule are used to determine current load. Rescheduling lends itself
towards two jobs completing on a single resource within short succession, which
rapidly reduces the service price.
6.2.4 Price Stability
Given there is instability in the service price and given the explanation pre-
sented in 6.2.3 a mechanism to alleviate the problems is tested. Comparisons
are therefore made between the round robin, rescheduling and the re-priced
(rescheduling) variations.
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Figure 18: Average Time Between Billing Events for each Given Due Date)
To further promote the explanation given in 6.2.3 the time between billing
events is shown in figure 18. It can be seen the time between billing events does
not differ that greatly between any of the three series before due dates 20 and
24. It can then be seen that the rescheduling variation gets a much greater range
of possible values and the average from one run to the next differs markedly.
Essentially the average time between bills varies much more in the rescheduling
case then it does in either the round robin or repriced variations.
Figure 19: Standard Deviation for the Time between Billing Events for each
Given Due Date)
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To continue the premise that rescheduling causes billing to removed jobs from
the schedule at similar times, thus causing price drops, the standard deviation
for the time between bills is shown in figure 19. The standard deviation for
both the rescheduling case and the repriced increases but the rescheduling case
increases much quicker. In considering 19 and 18, it can be seen that the average
time for the Round Robin and Repriced variations does not move, while the
rescheduling variation does. It can also be seen that the time between bills
in the rescheduling and the repriced variation begins to vary more with larger
due dates, though the repriced variation maintains the average better. This
maintenance of the average means the price is likely to be more stable.
Figure 20: Average Service Price (For Each Due Date)
In testing the instability consideration also has to fall on the average service
price over each of the runs (see figure 20). The service price for rescheduling
and round robin are about equal/and within error margins until the later due
dates of 20 and 24, which mirrors what is happening with the time between
bills. It can be deduced that the only thing that distinguishes round robin
and the rescheduling variation is related to how the rescheduling occurs i.e.
something happens due to rescheduling, or the ineffectiveness of the rescheduling
algorithm. The rescheduling variation cannot therefore be efficiently performing
the rescheduling with respect to the pricing model, causing the service price to
go down.
It can also be seen in figure 20 that the re-priced rescheduling variation does
not initially perform as well in terms of service price. This is not surprising as
actions that have been executed do not contribute to the service price, hence
it is at a disadvantage. It can be observed that as the due date increases, this
effect is diminished. This is due to larger schedules, which ensure the work that
has been executed and is yet to be billed makes up a smaller proportion of the
schedule.
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This disadvantage should however exist throughout and it could be expected
that its average service price should never approach that of the rescheduling vari-
ation. It however surpasses the service price of the plain rescheduling variation,
which should always be in a better position to obtain a higher service price.
It should also be noted that there is a possibility as the maximum budget
possible is 18,000 that the service price is tending towards a maximum in an
asymptotic fashion i.e. it will not reach this maximum value, but will approach
very close. The re-priced variation could therefore be less susceptible during its
approach to this maximum.
Hence it can be seen that it performed very similarly to re-priced and round
robin until this point. We therefore introduce figure 21 which examines the
service price over time in the same fashion as figure 15.
Figure 21: Service Price over Time (Due Date = 24)
The re-priced variation obtains a similar service price to the rescheduling
variant however more importantly, it does not suffer from random dips in the
service price and only one outlier moves away from the 12,000 to 18,000 band
of service prices.
6.3 Discussion upon Price Stability
In this section we discuss the stability of prices in relation to dynamic pricing
models. Dynamic pricing is the adaptation of the price of resources in accor-
dance with demand. This gives rise to a situation shown in figure 22 where the
following is the case:
• The price is set by observing the current schedule for demand information
• The schedule has work added to it which is effected by the price of re-
sources, causing a circular relationship.
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Figure 22: Price and Schedule Dependence
• The schedule has work removed from it which may affect the resource
price, though this depends upon the pricing strategy used.
6.3.1 Maintaining Selection Pressure
If this relationship is to be maintained, in order to get prioritisation effects then
the price must feature as a selecting pressure in the schedule. If it does not then
the price effects the schedule relationship is diminished or removed while the
price will remain observant of the schedule.
This relationship may diminish if the budget is set sufficiently high as to no
longer be a selection pressure. Noting that the budget being to high is in relation
to the mark-up and amount of work that is part of the job i.e. more work or
higher mark-ups means the budget must also be higher given the same resource
price. In considering the user’s preference towards saving money, it is likely that
they are going to render as little money available for the job as possible, so they
are incentivised to maintain the price effects the schedule relationship.
6.3.2 Effectors of Price Stability
In terms of price stability heterogeneity is an important aspect this can either
relate to the jobs, aspects of the schedule or the resources used. In terms of jobs
the following aspects cause effects:
Size of the Job (Amount of Work) If the price is set by how far ahead of
time the last work completes is then the following is the case. The greater
the size of the job, in terms of how much is to be computed then the
greater the resource price. If billing occurs with larger jobs then the
comparison is performed against the current time so the larger jobs no
longer affect the price. This is beneficial as the price is gradually becomes
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less dependent upon a single job. This mechanism prevents the price
from dropping rapidly but when new jobs arrive the price can still spike,
although admittedly in doing so it follows demand.
Size of the Job (Task Count) This directly effects how many actions are
placed in the queue. If pricing is based upon an action count then during
billing actions are removed from the schedule and the price drops. Hence
when jobs have many tasks the price drops further, making this form of
pricing subject to heterogeneity in the job. The use of action counts in
this case also does not respect the relative size of work, so again causes
difficulties.
Billing Frequency/Rate Work is Cleared from the Schedule The frequency
of billing is of importance, in cases where the removal of work from the
schedule causes changes in the price. This can be seen in cases such as
where prices are based upon action/job/task counts, or amount of work
in the schedule in terms of cycles, if completed work that is not billed
contributes towards the current price.
Billing Frequency If billing is performed at the end of each job more work is
cleared from the schedule then if it was billed at the completion of every
task. In terms of stability it therefore may be beneficial to bill on a per
task basis, even though this breaks the initial premise of billing for a bag
of tasks.
Job Acceptance Frequency which is in part upon the arrival rate of jobs,
i.e. if no jobs are submitted none may be accepted. It is the principle
actor in terms of increasing the current resource price and the greater the
amount of work accepted at any one time then the more the price will
rise.
It is also based upon parameters such as the remaining time available for
the job, i.e. due date and deadline and the budget requirements and size
of the job. Hence the overlapping of jobs in regards to their available space
should be considered such as in section 6.2.3.
The job acceptance frequency is important as the more work in a given
schedule then the greater the price. The acceptance rate should also relate
strongly to the ability to clear work from the schedule i.e. over the long term
accepting more work than can be cleared is unsustainable as wait times increase
indefinitely. Therefore in terms of resources the following aspect also causes
effects:
Machine Availability and Speed This relates directly to the ability of the
system as a whole to both accept work, i.e. the permitable queue size is
bigger and also the ability to clear work away from the schedule is faster.
Network Speed this relates to how quickly data may be transferred and hence
the ability to clear and bill work from the schedule. The faster this can
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happen the greater the possibility for price fluctuations. In been able to
clear work away faster this changes how fast work may be accepted.
The Schedule’s Quality This is variation upon the comment of machine avail-
ability, speed and network speed etc. It however relates to the schedule
generated. If the schedule utilises the resources more efficiently then it is
more likely to be able to clear work from the schedule and cause billing
events to occur, which in turn changes the price.
6.3.3 Counteracting Price Instability
In sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.4 it was seen that before the budget constraints
became dominant that selection pressures did not favour jobs based upon the
budget available. If a Grid become overworked then the economic selection
pressures are required. This means the economic factors should be made to be
dominant by changing the resource/service price.
It was also seen in section 6.2.2 how price stability affected the ability of the
mechanism to maintain this selection pressure. This was then further discussed
in section 6.2.3 and assessed further in section 6.2.4. The various ways that
might be used to obtain a more stable price are therefore discussed and the
possible options are hence listed below:
Step Change From a Previous Price The mechanism by which the price
is selected may be changed to make an incremental step change from the
previous price. This would hence avoid some of the fluctuations and allow
for rescheduling. The moderated changes however would have to reflect
the completion of spikes in load. Spikes in load can occur for example just
before an important conference [1]. The price smoothing mechanism would
be required to remain responsive and should not for example artificially
maintain a high price at the end of a peak in demand. This is because the
system as a whole could either have unrealized profit or utility [8, 44].
Do not Rely upon Completed Work for Pricing The is by far the sim-
plest solution, by simply ensuring that pricing does not rely upon already
completed work for determining the resource cost. This means any billing
event will not affect the price, by removing jobs from the schedule that
are used as part of the measure of current load. An example of such a
measure would be to take the difference between the current time and the
average completion time of all jobs for the provider.
Maintain an Even Billing Distribution An alternative though needlessly
complicated option would be to ensure the billing events were purposefully
held apart. In holding these events further apart it would reduce the
number of occurrences, where a lot of work is removed from the schedule
at the same time. This would require a scheduling algorithm that was
geared specifically towards the pricing mechanism. If individual tasks
were not allowed to interweave, then this would help prevent the near
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simultaneous execution of billing actions. However, if a single very large
job completes then regardless of dispersion of billing events the price would
fall and potentially harm the selection process.
6.4 Time and Cost Constraints Compared
Following the experimentation in this section it is possible to compare time and
cost constraints and show how they are related within the pricing model, these
differences and similarities are therefore explored below.
The budget constrains across all jobs evenly based upon the current system
load, regardless of if they can be allocated in a position that is far into the future.
This is in difference to due date and deadline which will not constrain based
on load if the current load is high and the due date/deadline is sufficiently
far in the future. Essentially the closer the temporal parameters are to the
current time then the lower the available slack in scheduling and hence the
more likely it is that they respond to the current system load. The budget as a
selection pressure also adapts based upon the mark-up, current system load and
the expected resource usage as indicated by the schedule covering work in the
future. Thus if more work is required to be performed then it is more expensive
and hence more likely to act as a selection pressure.
The due date and deadline acts as a selection pressure based upon the current
load and amount of work to be performed, but does not directly take a mark-
up as a modifier. The mark-up however changes the breakeven point which is
between the due date and deadline, thus the temporal pressures can be adjusted
as well. This effect is not however seen with other [2, 3, 16, 17, 6] related gradient
decent based models and is due to the removal of the direct relationship between
the available budget and the price paid, causing the introduction of a mark-up
for the broker, e.g. in LibraSLA[17] the budget is the price paid unless the soft
deadline is passed.
Temporal constraints within the ISQoS system and other related models are
also likely to cause a sequence of loading and unloading. This is caused by the
pressure of such a time constraint becoming more effective under heavy load
and then waning after it has been effective in preventing jobs from entering the
market and can be considered symptomatic of deadline based approaches. The
budget constraint is however more complex in this regard and can be used in
this situation to preferentially select jobs with different budgets, job sizes and
mark-ups.
The budget in the experimentation presented acts like a spot price. The
price is determined from the immediate load profile. If the due date is far in
advance a futures price might be more applicable, as it no longer reflects the
current load. This means the price in the future could be different to a more
current price and be based upon the estimated future demand!
The ISQoS negotiation mechanism acts as a tender contract market. An
auction and batch based system seems incompatible with the idea of reschedul-
ing to meet time constraints. Auctions still have attractive properties in terms
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of competition, which is something ISQoS finds more difficult. This discussion
is summarised in Table 1.
Table 1: Cost and Time Constraints Compared
Concept Due Date/Deadline Budget
Reflects current load Yes: unless constraints are
far in the future.
Yes: unless budget is very
high. Requires price to
follow demand.
Influencing factors None: effects gradient
in due date to dead-
line period, though the
breakeven point moves.
Mark-up: Makes the job
more favourable to the
broker, but consumes the
budget quicker.
Constraining upon reflects
the job’s expected re-
source usage
Partially: Only when due
date and deadline are
close to the current time
relative to the amount of
work required to be per-
formed. Slack however re-
flects usage.
Yes: Cost increases with
more time upon resource
that is requested.
Creates availability win-
dow (Temporally)
Yes: By Definition. Yes: If price increases
due to load then the
budget creates a notion
of maximum acceptable
load. The work already
present removes space ear-
lier on in the schedule.
Creates availability win-
dow (Fiscally)
Yes: A breakeven point is
formed, between the due
date and deadline.
Yes: By Definition.
7 Feature Comparison
In this section the ISQoS broker is compared and contrasted with similar sched-
ulers/brokers. The Grid schedulers and brokers that are evaluated that form
the current state of the art are: Condor/G [45], PBS [25], Oracle Grid Engine
[46], Globus Toolkit, GridWay [47], OpenCCS [48, 49, 50], Nimrod/G [51] and
GridEcon [30, 31]. An initial discussion of the evaluation criteria will be given
followed by a tabulated assessment of the criteria.
7.1 Cost & Time Guarantees
In Grids given the finite amount of resources if time guarantees are to be imple-
mented then it is required to have an understanding of the priority of each job
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to be completed as only a certain fraction of jobs can be completed within the
allotted time constraints. Economics is a technique that may be used to realise
this prioritisation.
The ISQoS Broker and similar brokers such as Nimrod/G have been devel-
oped with economics in mind. Nimrod/G provides the choice of four different
scheduling algorithms and allows for the selection of cost and time constraints
[20]. The ISQoS providers allow for variable scheduling algorithms to be used,
both economically aware and otherwise. In ISQoS it is possible for cost un-
aware scheduling algorithms to be used within the process while maintaining
an economic approach due to the economic models structure. This approach is
preferred as it allows ISQoS providers to return estimates as guidance, when the
scheduling algorithm cannot meet the economic or time constraints, which is not
possible when following economically oriented algorithms such as in Nimrod/G.
The Nimrod/G cost algorithms are simple as previously discussed in section
5.2. For example if the cost optimize algorithm is used and the deadline con-
straint is not actively having an affect then it stacks all work upon the cheapest
resource, without any form of load levelling. This is even the case if a second
equally cheapest resource is present. The Cost Time Optimization algorithm
partly gets around this by grouping resources of equal cost together and then
allocating to the fastest resource, thus providing better load balancing. Though
this is not best when dealing with costs on a continuous scale, where using the
ratio between cost and resource speed would be better. The time optimization
algorithm works in a simple earliest completion time fashion while respecting
the budget constraints.
Oracle Grid Engine has three classes of job ranking policy, including a ticket
based mechanism that provides a proportional share based mechanism, an ur-
gency based mechanism i.e. priority and the final option is to have custom
policies [46]. Proportional share mechanisms can be seen to be a primitive eco-
nomic mechanisms [44] hence Oracle Grid Engine could be considered to have
some cost awareness. Though proportional share based mechanisms tend only
to consider sharing resources and do not further control the flow of where jobs
are allocated.
7.2 Advance Reservation Support
Advance Reservation is a key requirement in been able to establish any form of
completion time guarantees as it provides the opportunity for guarantees to be
realised.
Advance reservation is possible in several middleware solutions, but it must
be noted at that it requires estimated durations for each task, which are not
always available. This therefore means that reservations must last at least as
long as the duration of the task for the execution to work correctly. Middleware
is hence is likely to support reservations but is not likely to put them to use in
environments centred upon having high machine utilisation.
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7.3 Queuing vs Scheduling
Most Grid Infrastructure (schedulers/brokers/middleware) use queue based mech-
anisms as opposed to scheduling in the same fashion as operational research.
Condor, PBS and Grid Engine are good examples of such a queue based ap-
proach. The requirement to act in a queue based fashion, stems from the need
to keep the resources of the Grid working and no intent to provide time and
cost provision. A scheduling based approach requires that job’s size is known,
but it then allows for guarantees in completion time to provided. The Mauri
Scheduer, OpenCCS and ISQoS mechanisms differ in this regard and use a
scheduling based approach. Below in Table 2 the differences between a queuing
and scheduling based system are highlighted [49]:
Table 2: Queuing vs Scheduling [49]
Queuing System Scheduling System
Considered time frame present present and future
Runtime estimates not required required
Submission leads to insert in queues complete reschedule
Job start times known no yes
Reservations difficult yes, trivial
Deadline scheduling optional yes, trivial
Backfilling optional yes, trivial
Examples PBS, NQS, LL, ... Maui Scheduler, OpenCCS
7.4 Negotiated Job Submission
In regards to job submission it is useful to understand how quickly results are
likely to be returned from each provider. This is dependent upon the current
workload of the environment relative to its capacity and other constraints such
as the job’s priority/value and the jobs size.
In order to achieve an estimated completion time, a candidate schedule needs
producing. In other none ISQoS infrastructures this mechanism simply does
not exist. Jobs are simply submitted to a provider by a user whom has been
informed of current resource utilisation.
The lack of this candidate schedule mechanism limits the ability to perform
any sense of negotiation as it would be difficult to relate the work that is to
be submitted and its completion requirements to resource availability. It also
means brokers are reliant upon metrics such as current workload and queue
length which are unrealistic measures to use when guarantees upon cost and
time of job completion are required.
Current workload (i.e. amount of machines/operators that are busy) and
queue length measures only relate to the current situation upon the Grid, which
will quickly change. They could be likened to a call centre in which a blanket
statement of all operators are busy and you are x in the queue. In the call
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centre’s case many ”jobs” are of a similar size and the expected time to been
served can be guessed. In the case of the Grid jobs differ in sizes and have
varying amounts of data to transfer which causes coupling between the jobs i.e.
two jobs using the same network can only stage out/in together by sharing the
bandwidth, thus slowing each other down.
7.5 Monitoring, Adaptation and Rescheduling
Rescheduling is an important tool when the dynamic nature of the Grid is
considered. It can aid in recovering from errors and is also useful in moving
tasks’ advance reservations in order to honour more agreements or the current
agreements better.
A summary of the capacity to reschedule is provided below:
• ISQoS - Periodic scheduling, with the ability to dynamically select the
period at runtime and rescheduling upon job submission is also allowed.
• Oracle Grid Engine - Periodic scheduling only, jobs enter a queue before
being scheduled fully [46].
• GridWay MetaScheduler - It has both periodic and event driven reschedul-
ing i.e. when performance slowdown or remote failure is detected [52].
• OpenCCS Rescheduling is performed upon the submission of a new job.
• Condor The DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) manager that handles work-
flows is capable of generating rescue DAGs when it exists with an error
code. The rescue DAG is a new DAG listing the elements of the original
DAG left unexecuted. To remedy the situation, the user can examine the
rescue DAG correct any mistakes in submission and then resubmit it as a
normal DAG.
7.6 Advanced Discovery, Scheduling API & Flexible Pric-
ing
In the ISQoS provider delivers an API for developers of new scheduling algo-
rithms, it is capable of hiding away much of the difficulty of Grids and presents
the scheduling as merely the allocating of jobs to resources. For example it de-
termines the estimated completion time for each job on a given resource and uses
the same API mechanisms for both execution and data transfers. The advanced
discovery mechanism given presents a list of capable resources for a given job
that are available for allocation, thus removing an implementers requirements
to check themselves.
The scheduling algorithm may easily be swapped out for experimental pur-
poses (see section 5.2) with alternatives and the pricing mechanisms may also
similarly be swapped out (see section 5.4) such that any commodity market
pricing strategy can be formed by a given provider.
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7.7 User vs System Centric Scheduling
The majority of Grid Middleware/Brokers and Schedulers are system centric[11,
4, 2, 53]. In that they aim to maximise utilisation of Grid resources or are
otherwise orientated towards system oriented metrics.
ISQoS is different in its setup in that it is more balanced and considers the
users objectives, especially in terms of delivery time and how much it costs.
The cost however is also system centric in that the price can be made to adapt
to current load and hence control utilisation, whilst also ensuring the provider
benefits from providing Grid resources.
7.8 Open Standards
In Grid middleware in order to gain a degree of interchangeability and gen-
eral compatibility so that different middleware’s can work together either open
standards or a large amount of adaptors, that complicate integration efforts are
needed. In recent years there has been a heavy drive towards open standards.
The ISQoS broker therefore implements standards such as WS-Agreement, WS-
Agreement negotiation and Job Submission Description Language (JSDL) as
well as web service based standards, WSRF, WS-Notification, WS-Security.
7.9 Comparison Study
In this section each of the brokers/middleware are compared. They are split
into three tables, one for best effort approaches (Table 3), one for QoS oriented
(Table 4) and one for economic approaches (table 5).
In Table 3 the best effort approaches are discussed. These are characterised
by queue based scheduling that is centred around the resources and aiming to
keep them as busy as possible.
In later work there are substantial efforts to provide quality of service provi-
sion with respect to reliability. The vast variations of different middleware and
their configurations gives rise to meta-schedulers such as GridWay, i.e. ones that
control and submit work to local Grid infrastructures using adaptors, which in
turn schedule the work for completion. The OpenCCS software provides a fully
schedule based solution to deploying Grid resources and given the work of the
HPC4U project allows for resilience to resource failure. These two QoS oriented
middlewares are shown in Table 4.
There is also a focus upon the development of economic models to control
Grids, given their diverse nature. Early work such as Nimrod/G focussed solely
upon Auction based approaches. Later work such as GridEcon took a top down
approach creating a set of economically oriented services which be used in the
Grid. The ISQoS project takes this service orientated approach and develops
quality of service around the concept of job completion time and cost. These
economic approaches are shown in Table 5.
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Table 3: Feature Comparison Study - Best Effort
Best Effort
Condor-G Portable
Batch
System
(PBS)
Oracle Grid
Engine
Globus
Advanced Discovery no no no yes via
Globus MDS
Cost & Time
Guarantees
no no no no
Advance Reservation
Support
no no/yes with
Maui
yes yes
Queuing vs Scheduling
queue queue
schedul-
ing with
Maui
queue queue
Negotiated Job
Submission
no no no no
Rescheduling no no allows check-
pointing
no
Monitoring yes no some yes
Adaptation no no some -
QMaster can
auto-restart
no
Open Standards no no some DR-
MAA
no
User vs System
Centric
system system system system
Plug-in Scheduling no no yes (some
flexibility)
no
Flexible Pricing no no no no
46
Table 4: Feature Comparison Study - QoS
QoS
OpenCCS GridWay
Advanced Discovery yes yes
Cost & Time
Guarantees
time only no
Advance Reservation
Support
yes depending
on un-
derlying
infrastruc-
ture
Queuing vs Scheduling
queue queue
Negotiated Job
Submission
no no
Rescheduling yes with
HPC4U
yes
Monitoring yes with
HPC4U
yes
Adaptation yes with
HPC4U
yes
Open Standards no (WS-
Agreement
used in
AssessGrid)
some DR-
MAA
User vs System
Centric
system system
Plug-in Scheduling yes yes
Flexible Pricing no no
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Table 5: Feature Comparison Study - Economic
Economic
Nimrod/G GridEcon ISQoS
Advanced Discovery yes potential yes
Cost & Time
Guarantees
yes potential yes
Advance Reservation
Support
no potential yes
Queuing vs Scheduling
scheduling scheduling scheduling
Negotiated Job
Submission
yes potential yes
Rescheduling yes potential yes
Monitoring no potential yes
Adaptation no potential potential
Open Standards no yes yes
User vs System
Centric
system potential both
Plug-in Scheduling no yes yes
Flexible Pricing no auction
only
yes yes
8 Conclusion
This paper presents the ISQoS broker and its associated economic model for
applying guarantees to jobs on the Grid in terms of time and cost. The model
creates upper bounds around these two constraints in a graduated fashion in
order to discourage the approach to such constraints. The SLA structure and
negotiation process is discussed that allows the user to understand through
rounds of negotiation the current status of the Grid with a reflection upon the
work that is being submitted.
An evaluation is performed that demonstrates how the proposed model gen-
erates selective prioritising behaviour based upon the budget. This is performed
with SLAs on a per jobs basis, under the understanding that it assists priori-
tising individual jobs and provides a clear route for pricing based upon existing
workload pressures.
It is then further shown that rescheduling can effect the market by reducing
the price rapidly by billing events in rapid succession. The effect of which
removes actions from the schedule that are in turn used as a measure of the
current load which determines the price. Recommendations are hence made
to alleviate the issues encountered and demonstrated. This can be seen as an
introduction into how scheduling can have market implications and further study
of different algorithms and their markets effects is considered to hold merit.
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The paper is then summarised with a discussion upon the differences between
the time and cost constraints within such gradient based time cost models and
a comparison study is performed between the ISQoS broker and other selected
work from the literature. The work presented has been shown to be a viable
mechanism for providing time and cost guarantees by negotiation within a com-
pute service market, that is equally applicable to both Grids and Clouds acting
as a compute service, where payment is associated with the work performed and
not so directly the tool/virtual machine that was used to perform the work.
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